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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
of CPLR 3101(a) in light of its liberal construction in Allen, the court
concluded that the policy limits were relevant to the "subject matter"
of the case and that Allen mandates their discovery. 6 It also reasoned
that since the insurer is the real party in interest in a negligence action,
disclosure of the limits of coverage would permit the plaintiff's attorney
to better assess the depth of his adversary's commitment. Additionally,
the court found that such pretrial discovery in the sound discretion of
the judge would not serve to invade the defendant's privacy 67 and it
rejected the argument that the plaintiff's counsel might be tempted to
demand excessive damages if high policy limits were discovered.6 8
The settlement rationale for permitting disclosure of the defen-
dant's insurance policy limits is compelling, especially in light of CPLR
104, which mandates liberal construction of the CPLR "to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial
proceeding." Moreover, should this controversy reach the Court of
Appeals, defendants will find it difficult to overcome the force of the
liberal construction of CPLR 3101(a) mandated by Allen.6 9 Insurer
opposition to disclosure may well be reevaluated as carriers for co-
defendants and third parties increasingly find themselves in the position
of adversaries under the apportionment rule of Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co. 70 While the inception of no-fault insurance in New York may
reduce the urgency for change, the Legislature should not thereby be
deterred from amending CPLR 3101(a) to effect this needed reform.
CPLR 3101(a)(1): Perpetuation of a party's own testimony by deposi-
tion permitted on basis of advanced age.
Pursuant to the full disclosure mandate of CPLR 3101(a)(1), a
of the defendant's policy since its purpose is to eliminate unnecessary delay, and such
discovery, he averred, would not cause any delay. 73 Misc. 2d at 147, 341 N.Y.&2d at 223.
The court was also influenced by the proposed Westchester County Supreme Court rule
which would require pretrial disclosure of insurance policy limits in all personal injury
and wrongful death cases after the filing of a statement of readiness.
66 73 Misc. 2d at 159, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
17 The court declined to endorse the theory advanced by some authorities that the
plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract and therefore possesses a
discoverable interest, characterizing it as "appealing but somewhat tenuous." Id. at 155 n.4,
341 N.Y.S.2d at 280 n.4. See generally Jenkins, Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance
Limits: Quillets of the Law, 14 KAN. L Rrv. 59, 71-78 (1965). The court failed, however,
to offer a superior argument.
68 73 Misc. 2d at 156, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 231. The court refused to impugn counsel's
professional responsibility. It noted that, realistically, since New York does not permit
indefinite demands for damages or verdicts in excess of the damages sought, plaintiffs will
inevitably set the highest monetary amount consistent with the injuries received.
89 See 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 8101, supp. commentary at 7 (1972); Id., commentary at
11 (1970); H. WAcrrELL, NEW YorK PRAcncE UNDa TH CPLR 237-58 (3d ed. 1970).
70 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1972), noted in 47 Sr. JoHN's L.
Rav. 185 (1972).
1973]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
party, by service of notice,71 may take the deposition of an adverse party
without a showing of special circumstances. 2 CPLR 3101, unlike CPA
288, however, does not expressly permit a party to perpetuate his own
testimony by self-deposition. Case law has construed the statute as per-
mitting this practice without a showing of special circumstances. 73
Boyo v. New York City Transit Authority74 reaffirms the validity of
this practice.
In Boyo, the defendant opposed the plaintiff's motion to per-
petuate her testimony pursuant to CPLR 3101 on the ground that the
plaintiff, a 75-year-old woman, failed to submit a medical affidavit
proving that illness, likelihood of death, or other special circumstances
mandated the deposition. The Supreme Court, Kings County, held that
the plaintiff was entitled to perpetuate her testimony solely on the
basis of her advanced age,7 5 relying on the legislative intent expressed
in CPLR 3403, which provides for a trial preference as a matter of right
"in any action upon the application of a party who has reached the
age of seventy-five years."
Such a motion should be granted regardless of the absence of
special circumstances.7 6 Clearly, the intent of the CPLR is to liberalize
disclosure. Moreover, CPLR 311 7,77 by restricting the use of depositions
at trial, discourages needless self-depositions. Where this practice would
be burdensome to the adverse party, he may seek a protective order
under CPLR 3103.
CPLR 3101(a)(4): Fourth Department allows disclosure against non-
party witness where it will aid preparation for trial.
CPLR 3101(a)(4) provides that a nonparty witness may be required
to disclose information material and necessary to a party's claim or
defense provided that there exist adequate special circumstances. When
the nonparty witness might have been unavailable for trial, or was
71 CPLR 3107.
72 In re Estate of Keljikian, 44 Misc. 2d 176, 253 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
County 1964).
78 Lapensky v. Gordon, 41 Misc. 2d 958, 246 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964),
discussed in The Biannual Survey, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 433 (1964) (72-year-old plain-
tiff permitted to take her own deposition without a showing of special circumstances). See
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 18, 22 (1970); 7 CARMODY-WAIT 2d, § 42:79, at
132 (1966); 3 WK&M 3101.22. Cf. Shaw v. Hospital Ass'n, 57 Misc. 2d 461, 292 N.Y.S.2d
984 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1968).
74 72 Misc. 2d 165, 339 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972).
75 Id. at 166, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
76 See note 73 supra. Cf. CPLR 104, 3101(a)(1).
77 CPLR 3117 requires that a party seeking to introduce a deposition at trial show
that the witness is either: (1) dead; (2) more than 100 miles from the courtroom; (3) un-
available because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; (4) unavailable despite
diligent efforts to procure his attendance; or that exceptional circumstances exist.
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